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HAVE WE FORGOTTEN K-12? THE NEED FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES TO IMPROVE TITLE IX ENFORCEMENT
Katrina A. Pohlman*
In the fall of 2000, the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review examined 129 public
high schools in southwestern Pennsylvania to evaluate the region’s
compliance with Title IX.  The Tribune-Review promptly published the1
results, which were bleak. During the 1999–2000 academic year, two out of
every three athletes were boys.  Moreover, sixty-nine cents out of every dollar2
spent on school athletic programs went to boys, with the average school
spending $493 on each male athlete and $350 on each female athlete.  The3
individual results of two schools were especially troubling: Duquesne High
School had only nine girls playing organized sports in 1999–2000;  Clairton4
High School had only fifteen spots on just one female sports
team—basketball.  Finally, the survey noted that collegiate athletic programs5
had been recruiting significantly less in the region.  As one college coach6
explained, even the area’s rare, exceptional athlete frequently struggled in the
collegiate setting, since such athletes had never had the opportunity to become
accustomed to competing against the same caliber of athletes when younger.7
What was perhaps even more troubling than the study’s depiction of
inequality was the clear disinterest in reform. Only 49 of the 129 schools were
able to name their Title IX coordinators,  which schools are required to have8
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by federal law.  Moreover, neither state nor federal authorities had yet9
investigated a single case of inequality between the boys’ and girls’ athletic
programs.  Thus, although the disparity was startling, few schools seemed to10
consider the inequality to be abnormal or problematic.
At its start, Title IX produced numerous opportunities for female
secondary school student athletes. Prior to its enactment in 1972, only 300,000
girls played high school sports per year, representing only 7% of high school
athletes nationwide.  Although Title IX’s scope far exceeds athletics—it was11
designed to eliminate sex discrimination in all educational programs and
activities that receive federal financial assistance—its application to athletic
programs became apparent by the 1980s. By 1994, over 2.12 million girls
played high school sports per year.  In short, the immediate effect of Title IX12
was truly monumental.
However, as the recent Pittsburgh Tribune-Review survey demonstrates,
the battle for female athletic equality is far from over. The main problem lies
not in the substantive provisions themselves, which do not condone the current
status of public secondary school athletic programs in Western Pennsylvania,
but rather in the lack of Title IX enforcement. There are two methods for such
enforcement: (1) private lawsuits, and (2) investigations by the Department of
Education’s Office of Civil Rights. This Note argues that the availability of
punitive damages in private lawsuits is an effective and necessary method to
encouraging Title IX compliance. Unfortunately, thus far, virtually no courts
have upheld such awards against secondary schools for Title IX violations.
Although this Note uses a Western Pennsylvanian case study as a
springboard for its analysis, it does not suggest that Title IX enforcement
problems are limited to that area. On the contrary, the Note assumes that
Western Pennsylvania is likely representative of many school districts across
the nation. In addition, the paper does not portend to suggest that enforcement
problems are limited to public K-12 schools. Private and post-secondary
schools, which have also had difficulty encouraging Title IX compliance,
would benefit from the availability of punitive damages as well.
Part I of this Note will discuss the functions of punitive damages in civil
rights cases and their application in the Title IX context. Thereafter, the Note
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will focus on the two obstacles to the availability of punitive damages in Title
IX claims. Part II will examine whether public schools, as municipalities,
should have immunity from punitive damages under the Supreme Court case
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., which provides municipalities with
such immunity for § 1983 claims.  This Note will analyze Newport to identify13
the test adopted in that case, study district courts’ subsequent application of
Newport, and conclude that the test counsels against municipal immunity in
Title IX claims. Part III will examine the second, and more recent, obstacle to
punitive damages in Title IX litigation. In 2002, the Supreme Court held in
Barnes v. Gorman that punitive damages were not available under Title VI,14
a statute that has oftentimes been analogized to Title IX. This Note will
discuss the errors in Barnes and explain why Barnes should not be extended
to Title IX claims. In Part IV, the Note will conclude by emphasizing the
importance of improved Title IX enforcement and the role that punitive
damages can play. Although the Note will implore Congress to expressly
provide for the availability of punitive damages against public secondary
schools in Title IX claims, the Note will underscore that congressional action
is not necessary for courts to uphold such awards today.
PART I: PUNITIVE DAMAGES, CIVIL RIGHTS CASES, AND THE
TITLE IX CONTEXT
The concept of punitive damages is ancient, extending as far back as the
Code of Hammurabi, dated 1760 BC.  The modern Anglo-American doctrine15
of punitive damages first appeared in England in 1763.  Since then, most16
American courts have considered punitive damages to be an acceptable
common law remedy, a trend that was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court in 1851 in Day v. Woodworth.  Today, there is a wide consensus among17
American courts that punitive damages further two distinct, legitimate goals:
retribution and deterring harmful conduct.18
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In the civil rights context, retribution and deterrence remain important and
powerful functions of punitive damages. Although courts have not always
been receptive to this idea, punitive damages can also serve additional
functions  that become especially important in civil rights cases.  As the19 20
Supreme Court has acknowledged, by their very nature, civil rights cases often
involve incredibly vital yet non-monetary civil and constitutional rights:
“Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate
important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in
monetary terms . . . [A] successful civil rights plaintiff often secures important
social benefits that are not reflected in nominal or relatively small damages
awards.”  As such, punitive damages can play a uniquely useful role. First,21
punitive damages can educate the public about both the significance of a
particular civil rights law and the societal condemnation of violations of that
law.  Second, in practice, punitive damages can help compensate the victim22
by filling the gaps frequently left by compensatory damage awards in cases of
non-monetary harm.  Finally, as a result of their role in education and23
compensation, punitive damages can serve a paramount law enforcement
function by encouraging aggrieved individuals to bring vital civil rights
actions.24
Punitive damage awards are as important to Title IX lawsuits as they are
to other civil rights actions. Although most courts limit punitive damages to
cases with some type of deplorable conduct, such a limitation should not
inhibit punitive damages in the Title IX context. As the Supreme Court
recently affirmed in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, punitive damages usually
apply in cases of reckless conduct. Reckless conduct is by definition neither
intentional nor malicious, and does not even need to be “callous” toward the
risk of harming others, so long as the conduct is “unheedful” of such risk.25
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Schools that continue to fail to comply with Title IX fall directly into this
category of conduct: they are unheedful of the risk of harm to their female
athletes. Moreover, the Exxon Shipping Court noted that punitive damages
might also apply, regardless of culpability, when incentives to sue are needed
to prevent conduct from going un-remedied.  Once again, this is the exact26
enforcement problem that hinders Title IX.
Supreme Court decisions regarding Title IX remedies add further support
to the conclusion that punitive damages would be well served in the Title IX
context. Although the statute did not include an express private right of action,
the Supreme Court quickly held that a private right of action was implied.  Of27
course, since the private right was not express, Title IX did not specifically
delineate the scope of possible remedies for Title IX violations. In 1992, the
Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in the landmark case Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools.  In Franklin, the Supreme Court explained28
that common law provides a deep-rooted presumption of the availability of
“all appropriate remedies” unless Congress indicates otherwise.  The Court29
held that Congress had made no effort to restrict the presumption in Title IX
or in its subsequent amendments, and thus that “all appropriate remedies”
were available.  The Court did not mention exceptions for punitive or30
exemplary damages. Because Congress has taken no steps to regulate Title IX
damages in the interim, Franklin is still good law today.
Given the vital importance of punitive damages in civil rights cases
generally and Title IX lawsuits specifically, as well as the Supreme Court’s
lucid last words on Title IX damages in Franklin, punitive damages should be
one type of “appropriate remedy” that is available under Title IX.
Accordingly, the vast majority of lower courts have correctly interpreted the
broad holding of Franklin as allowing such damages.  Unfortunately,31
however, two other Supreme Court cases have become obstacles to lower
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courts’ willingness to award punitive damages under Title IX and have thus
needlessly hindered Title IX enforcement.
PART II: NEWPORT AND MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
The current state of the law is discouraging. Although most lower courts
acknowledge that Franklin allows for punitive damages under Title IX, all but
one have applied the older Supreme Court case City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc.  to avoid punitive damage awards against municipalities,32
including school districts, under Title IX.  Only one court, the Northern33
District of Iowa in Schultzen v. Woodbury Central Community School
District,  has engaged in the correct Newport analysis.34
In Newport, the Supreme Court held that municipalities have immunity
from punitive damages under § 1983.  In coming to that determination, the35
Court developed a two-step test. First, the Court looked for evidence that
Congress intended to disturb what the Court considered to be a well-settled
common law immunity.  Finding none, the Court turned to the second step,36
asking whether “considerations of public policy dictate a contrary result.”37
After analyzing the dual purposes of punitive damages—punishment and
deterrence—in the context of a § 1983 lawsuit, the Court found that removal
of immunity was not required. First, the Court explained that the goal of
punishment would not be served because innocent taxpayers, either through
an increase in taxes or through a reduction of public services, would shoulder
the burden, while plaintiffs, who would have already won compensatory
damages, would receive a windfall.  Next, the Court gave several reasons38
why the goal of deterrence would not be met. The Court explained that it was
uncertain whether municipal officers would be deterred when the exemplary
damages were against the municipality itself, since indemnification might not
be available under local law, and since individual officers might be incapable
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of paying such sizeable awards anyway.  Therefore, the Court believed that39
punitive damages against individuals would be a much more effective
deterrent.  Furthermore, the Court explained that corrective action would40
likely occur regardless of the exclusion of punitive damages, because
compensatory damage awards and superior officers’ concern for government
integrity would be sufficient motives for reform.  Overall, the Court held that41
the costs of punitive damages, when balanced against the uncertain benefits,
were too high.  The Court’s concern may have been heightened by the42
Court’s recent interpretation of § 1983 as encompassing both violations of
federal statutory law and constitutional law, which had the potential to create
a flood of litigation and punitive damage awards.43
Since public school districts are considered municipal entities,  federal44
district courts have struggled with reconciling Franklin with Newport. There
is no circuit court authority that district courts can look to for guidance. Of
course, since Newport was a § 1983 action, not a Title IX action, the Newport
rule is not automatically binding in the Title IX context. Instead, the two-part
Newport test should be applied to determine whether municipal immunity
from punitive damages should exist in Title IX claims. Unfortunately, all but
one of the district courts that have struggled with the issue have not properly
applied one or both prongs of the test. Two courts briefly explained that there
was no evidence that Congress intended to displace the common law
immunity, without discussing the public policy analysis required in step two.45
Another court cited Newport without any explanation at all, as if Newport
itself dictated the result.  The sole court to reject Newport immunity, Canty46
v. Old Rochester Regional School District,  had an equally cursory47
discussion. In Canty, the Massachusetts district court briefly stated that its
rejection of municipal immunity was prompted by “the sweeping language of
Franklin to allow ‘all available remedies,’” as well as the “reluctance of
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courts in this Circuit to offer municipal immunity in similar circumstances,”
but offered no further supporting explanation.  Thus, although Canty arrived48
at the better result, the proper analysis was still missing. Regardless of the
weakness of the Canty reasoning, it is worth noting that the district court
merely denied the school district’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s punitive
damages claim;  the court did not uphold an actual punitive damages award.49
As of publication time, the district court for the Northern District of Iowa
is the only court to properly engage Newport. In Schultzen v. Woodbury
Central Community School District,  a female student athlete filed a Title IX50
complaint alleging that female athletes were treated more severely than male
athletes for violating the school district’s conduct code.  The court examined51
both prongs of the Newport test in meticulous detail.  However, the district52
court nonetheless disregarded much of this sound analysis and followed the
trend of upholding municipal immunity.53
The first question in a proper Newport analysis is whether Congress
intended to disturb the common law municipal immunity in the Title IX
context. The Schultzen court quickly held that there was no evidence of
Congressional intent to displace the immunity.  However, while it is true that54
Congress did not expressly reject municipal immunity to punitive damages in
Title IX actions, the court should not have come to its conclusion so easily
because, as the Supreme Court wrote in Franklin, “Congress made no effort
[in the Title IX context] . . . to alter the traditional presumption in favor of any
appropriate relief for violation of a federal right.”  Since the Franklin55
Supreme Court did not mention Newport (which was decided more than a
decade earlier), a more logical conclusion is that Newport did not alter the
availability of appropriate remedies, including punitive damages.
Recent statutory amendments provide further evidence of congressional
intent. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress expressly exempted
municipalities and other governmental entities from punitive damage awards
in suits brought under Title VII, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
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and several sections of the Rehabilitation Act, without including Title IX or
Title VI (a frequent model for Title IX interpretation).  Thus, it seems that56
Congress intended immunity for certain causes of action, but not for others.
Moreover, since Title IX, Title VI, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act have
oftentimes been treated similarly,  Congress’s choice to include only one, not57
all three, in the Civil Rights Act appears to be a conscious decision, not an
oversight. The fact that Congress expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity for all three statutes in the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act
in 1986, which was enacted only five years earlier, makes the likelihood of
such an oversight even more remote.  Finally, Title IX’s statutory58
enforcement mechanism—the possible termination of federal
funds—demonstrates that Congress was not overly concerned that innocent
taxpayers might have to bear the cost of public schools’ noncompliance with
Title IX.
The presence of common law municipal immunity in the Title IX context
does not solely depend on evidence of Congressional intent. Under Newport,
municipal immunity should also be rejected if “public policy dictates a
contrary result” for Title IX cases. Unfortunately, the Schultzen court has been
the only court to address this second prong of the Newport test.59
As discussed in Part II, supra, Newport had four main bases for its
decision that public policy does not requiring waiving municipal immunity in
the § 1983 context: (1) waiver would not punish municipal officers, since only
innocent taxpayers would shoulder the burden, (2) waiver would not deter
municipal officers, since, again, only innocent taxpayers would shoulder the
burden, (3) punitive damages against individuals would be a more effective
deterrent, and (4) corrective action would likely occur regardless, due to
compensatory damage awards and superior officers’ concern for government
integrity.  Regarding the first two rationales, there is no difference between60
§ 1983, the statute at issue in Newport, and Title IX: in both instances, the fact
that punitive damages are passed onto innocent taxpayers diminishes in part
the punishment and deterrence of municipal officers.  However, there is a61
strong counterargument to the Newport rationale: although the officers will
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not themselves have to pay the punitive damage awards, they will still likely
face repercussions. A punitive damage award, which indicates not just a
careless act, but a wrongful act, would be highly publicized and would likely
result in at least a termination of employment for those deemed responsible.
The officers would probably not be able to hide behind the face of the
municipality, as unhappy taxpayers would demand that someone be held
accountable. Thus, in both Newport and in the Title IX context, the better
argument is that the deterrent effect is intact because municipal officers would
be punished if punitive damages against municipalities were allowed.
Unlike the first two rationales, the last two Newport rationales do not hold
up as well in the Title IX context. First, unlike § 1983 claims, punitive damage
awards against individuals do not offer a more effective deterrent, as
individuals are not subject to Title IX liability. The Schultzen court quickly
noted the importance of the distinction: “[T]he public’s interest in preventing
future discriminatory conduct in educational institutions may not be capable
of full realization under Title IX without the imposition of punitive damages
against municipal entities because individual offending officials are not, in
their individual capacities, subject to Title IX liability.”  Thus, this factor62
clearly counsels for a different result in Title IX lawsuits.
Likewise, unlike § 1983, corrective action is unlikely to occur in Title IX
claims in the absence of punitive damages. First, although Title IX’s statutory
mechanism establishes a procedure for terminating federal funding in the
event of a school’s noncompliance, such a termination has never occurred in
the more than thirty years since Title IX’s enactment. The Schultzen court
identified this distinction from § 1983 as well, calling the statutory mechanism
an “extreme remedy” that is “rarely imposed.”  Second, and more63
importantly, unlike § 1983 suits, where individuals may have lost wages,
medical bills, pain and suffering damages, etc., there are virtually no cases in
which compensatory damages were awarded in Title IX actions against
secondary school athletic programs. There is simply no economic value on the
opportunity to play sports in the public secondary school context, at least not
one that is easily calculated.  This factor, which the Schultzen court64
completely failed to identify, weighs even more strongly when considering
that the Newport court was especially concerned with preventing plaintiff
windfall—the receipt of both compensatory and punitive damages. Thus,
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under Newport, the removal of punitive damage awards leaves corrective
action solely in the hands of superior officers concerned with government
integrity. This is tantamount to having no enforcement mechanism at all. If
Title IX cannot be enforced, why have it in the first place?
There is another distinction between § 1983 and Title IX claims that
Newport’s reasoning does not expressly address. Unlike § 1983 claims, which
cover a wide range of behavior and are commonplace, Title IX claims,
especially actions regarding unequal athletic programs, are more rare.  Thus,65
the threat of a flood of litigation and punitive damage awards against public
secondary schools is minimal.
Unfortunately, the Schultzen court—the only court to engage in the
second prong of the Newport analysis—determined that, although “public
policy arguably dictates a divergence from the traditional presumption,” the
court’s inability to find any circuit court decisions authorizing punitive
damages without express statutory authority weighed in favor of applying
municipal immunity.  This conclusion is problematic. If express statutory66
authority were required, the second prong of the Newport test would be
irrelevant. Moreover, the requirement of express statutory authority goes
against both Cannon v. University of Chicago, which created an implied
private right of action,  and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,67
which did not require express language to uphold all appropriate common law
remedies.68
Overall, a proper analysis of Newport in the Title IX context demonstrates
that the availability of punitive damages against municipalities is not just a
useful deterrent, but a necessary tool to the successful enforcement of Title
IX. The cost of enforcement does not need to be high; punitive damages do
not need to be pervasive and bankrupting to be effective. Juries—taxpayers
and likely members of the local community—will probably not jump at the
opportunity to handicap a local public school. Moreover, Title IX’s statutory
remedy of terminating federal funding could potentially be even more
extreme. Unlike private litigation, where a jury can balance the need for
punishment and deterrence against harm done to local schools and taxpayers,
the termination of federal funding is an uncompromising removal of all federal
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funds, on which public school budgets depend. In short, the benefits of
punitive damages far outweigh the costs.
PART III: BARNES AND THE SPENDING CLAUSE
In 2002, a second hurdle between Title IX plaintiffs and punitive damages
arose. In Barnes v. Gorman, the Supreme Court held that punitive damages
were not available under § 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA) since they would not
be available under Title VI.  Although Barnes was not a Title IX case, the69
Fourth Circuit in Mercer v. Duke University quickly used Title VI as a proxy
and applied Barnes to Title IX claims with almost no analysis:
It is well established that Title IX . . . is also modeled after Title VI and is interpreted
and applied in the same manner as Title VI. . . . Thus, the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Barnes that punitive damages are not available under Title VI compels
the conclusion that punitive damages are not available for private actions brought to
enforce Title IX.70
The problem is two-fold: first, Barnes itself erred in its application of the
Spending Clause to Title VI; second, assuming that Barnes was decided
correctly, Mercer erred in applying the same rule in the Title IX context.
Unfortunately, even though the case remains unpublished,  district courts,71
with no other circuit court decisions to guide them, have unanimously
followed Mercer’s lead.72
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The Supreme Court case Barnes v. Gorman concerned an arrested
paraplegic who was improperly transported to a police station and refused the
opportunity to empty his urine bag, which resulted in serious medical
problems, including a bladder infection, serious lower back pain, and
uncontrollable spasms in his paralyzed areas.  The jury awarded the plaintiff73
$42,566.33 for medical expenses, $342,251.00 for lost past wages,
$500,000.00 for lost future wages, $150,000 for pain and suffering, and $1.2
million in punitive damages.  Thereafter, the trial court found that punitive74
damages were not available as a matter of law and vacated that portion of the
award.  The Supreme Court affirmed. Although not a Title VI case, the Court75
determined that punitive damages would not available under Title VI because
Title VI was enacted under the Spending Clause.  Consequently, the Court76
explained, since both § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the RA expressly looked
to Title VI to determine the scope of available remedies, punitive damages
were not available under either statute.77
The Barnes Court erred in its application of the Spending Clause to Title
VI. The Supreme Court originally determined that Title VI and Title IX were
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause because Congress attached
conditions to the award of federal funds in each statute.  As a result, the78
statutes are interpreted as being in the nature of a contract: in return for
federal funds, the entities agree to comply with federal conditions.  The79
Supreme Court discussed the effect of such an interpretation in Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman:
The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests
on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract.”
. . . There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State in unaware of the
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conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress
intends to impose a condition . . . it must do so unambiguously.80
Thus, Pennhurst requires that recipients have notice of any conditions
attached to the award of federal funds. Although Pennhurst does not excuse
recipients’ ignorance of unambiguous law, it does require that the conditions
imposed by Title VI and Title IX be clearly ascertainable. This rule makes
logical sense; recipients should be apprised of their contractual obligations.
The Supreme Court expanded this doctrine in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District, a Title IX sexual harassment case.  In holding81
that “it would ‘frustrate the purposes’ of Title IX to permit a damages
recovery against a school district for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a
student based on principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice,” the
Court explained more generally that, “[I]t does not appear that Congress
contemplated unlimited recovery in damages against a funding recipient where
the recipient is unaware of discrimination in its programs.”  In short, Gebser82
requires that recipients have actual knowledge of the facts at issue for damage
liability to apply. Thus, in addition to having notice of the conditions, as
required by Pennhurst, recipients must also have notice of the facts that give
rise to the discrimination.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court overextended the Pennhurst and
Gebser doctrines in Barnes v. Gorman.  In Barnes, the Court decided that83
since punitive damages are not generally available for breach of contract
claims,  the Board of Police Commissioners of Kansas City (the recipient of84
federal funding) did not have the requisite knowledge that the officers’
conduct could result in punitive damages. Thus, according to the Court, the
Board could not be held liable for such damages. This result does not follow
from Pennhurst’s statement of the law; the Court did not determine that the
recipient was “unaware of the conditions” imposed by the ADA and RA, nor
that ambiguities in the law made it “unable to ascertain what [was] expected
of it.”  Neither does the result follow from Gebser: the Court made no finding85
that the recipient was unaware of the officers’ discriminatory conduct, or of
any other facts of the case. Thus, instead of classifying the case as
demonstrating either a lack of clarity in the conditions or a lack of knowledge
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of the facts, the Court improperly excused the ignorance of an unambiguous
law—the common law availability of punitive damages affirmed in Franklin.86
The Court made two arguments in support of its extension of the
Pennhurst-Gebser doctrine, both weak. First, the Court stated that “it is
doubtful whether [the recipient] would even have accepted the funding if
punitive damages liability was a required condition.”  However, the87
contention that a recipient would reject funding due to the possibility of
liability for wrongful conduct is extremely circumspect. Entities that receive
federal funding rarely have cash to spare. On the contrary, police departments,
like public schools, probably already have strained budgets.
Second, the Court warned that punitive damages, when combined with
compensatory damages, “could well be disastrous.”  But the Court did not88
adequately explain why it was taking this determination out of the hands of
the jury. Although the original total award in Barnes was extensive—over $2
million dollars —there is no reason to think that every jury would slap a89
recipient with excessively high punitive damage awards, especially since
recipients are protected by constitutional limitations on such awards. Juries
can only award punitive damages when an intent threshold, such as
recklessness or malice, has been met. Juries are also asked to consider the
defendant’s ability to pay punitive damages, and courts have the power to
reduce or vacate excessive awards. Finally, in addition to taking the decision
out of the hands of the jury, the Supreme Court failed to take into account the
possibility that compensatory damages might be an insufficient deterrent in
particular circumstances. Interestingly, the Court’s concern for excessive
awards is at odds with the more extreme express statutory remedy of
terminating all federal funding.
Unfortunately, until Congress legislates otherwise, Barnes is binding
precedent for Title VI, the ADA, and the RA. However, it is not binding
precedent for Title IX. Mercer v. Duke University erred in applying Barnes to
Title IX claims, for doing so severely handicaps Title IX’s enforcement
mechanism, particularly regarding claims of inequality in the athletic
programs in public secondary schools.
As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that Barnes did not expressly
state that punitive damages were unavailable under Title IX, and such
language would have been dicta and thus circumspect regardless. More
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importantly, although Title VI was used as a proxy for the ADA and RA, both
of these statutes expressly direct courts to look to Title VI to determine the
scope of available remedies.  In contrast, there is no comparable statutory90
language in Title IX. Courts have construed Title VI and Title IX similarly in
some situations,  but nothing in Title IX’s language expressly directs courts91
to copy Title VI jurisprudence without explanation. Title VI and Title IX are
distinct statutes that attempt to remedy different instances of discrimination.
As such, any attempt to lump the statutes together without discussion, like the
court did in Mercer,  is little more than indolent judicial expediency.  The92 93
fact that the Supreme Court determined that both Title VI and Title IX were
enacted under the Spending Clause does not mean that a list of rules
automatically attaches to each statute. As the Court in Barnes explained, “we
have been careful not to imply that all contract-law rules apply to Spending
Clause legislation.”  Thus, the best approach is to examine each statute94
separately to determine which contract law rules are appropriate to apply.
An examination of Title IX claims counsels strongly against borrowing
the Title VI punitive damages bar. Similar to the application of municipal
immunity, discussed in Part II, supra, the main problem with applying Barnes
to Title IX claims is that it leaves many plaintiffs, and virtually all plaintiffs
that contest unequal athletic programs, without an adequate remedy,
effectively handicapping Title IX’s enforcement mechanism. The problem lies
in the fact that it is nearly impossible to place an economic value on playing
sports. This issue is compounded in the secondary school context: although
collegiate athletes can possibly cite lost scholarship money as a measure of
damages, most younger secondary school athletes can only argue that they
have been deprived of the potential to receive future athletic scholarships,
which are incredibly speculative. Consequently, unlike Title VI plaintiffs, who
might have lost wages or pain and suffering damages to recover, Title IX
plaintiffs will generally not have a claim for compensatory damages.
If punitive damages are not available under Title IX, plaintiffs are left
with only one reason to bring Title IX lawsuits: injunctive relief. This
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effectively brings Title IX’s deterrent value to zero. First, because students
will likely graduate before their case is concluded, students will be disinclined
to bring claims solely for injunctive relief. Second, if the only thing schools
and other recipients need to fear is a court-mandated requirement to change
policies, schools and other recipients have no incentive to remedy Title IX
violations prior to the commencement of a lawsuit. Although Title IX also
provides for a termination of federal funding, such a termination has never
occurred in the history of Title IX, as recipients are first given numerous
opportunities to comply with the law.  Likewise, the plaintiff’s ability to95
recover attorneys’ fees does not change the analysis. Instead of encouraging
Title IX compliance, attorneys’ fees awards only encourage schools and other
recipients to settle once a complaint has been filed. Moreover, the lack of a
punitive damage award may diminish the plaintiff’s level of success, thus
affecting the plaintiff’s ability to recover attorneys’ fees at all.96
Although Mercer v. Duke University concerned a collegiate athlete, not
a secondary school athlete, the case serves as a perfect example of this
dilemma. Heather Sue Mercer, who experienced success as a field goal place
kicker on her high school football team, decided to try out for the Duke
University team.  Although Title IX did not require the Duke coach to give97
Mercer the opportunity to try out, he did, and he eventually offered her a spot
on the team.  However, due to publicity concerns, the coach quickly began98
to discourage Mercer from participating.  He refused to let her attend the99
preseason camp.  He also suggested that she try other extracurricular100
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activities, such as beauty pageants or cheerleading.  In time, Mercer was not101
only taken off of the active roster, but eventually dismissed from the team,
even though she had been consistently kicking well at practice.  The jury102
found that the coach had discriminated against Mercer on the basis of her
gender and awarded her $1 in compensatory damages—Mercer did not have
an athletic scholarship and there was no other measure of compensatory
damages—and $2 million in punitive damages.103
Unfortunately, Mercer did not get to keep her award. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit, citing Barnes, vacated the punitive damage award.  In104
addition, the district court thereafter reduced Mercer’s attorneys’ fees award
by 20%. Using twisted logic, the court explained that Mercer had not received
the required “excellent results”: although Mercer had established that Duke
was liable for gender discrimination, Mercer had been unable to prove
compensatory damages and her punitive damage award had been vacated.105
Thus, Mercer felt the blow of the vacated punitive damage award twice. After
years of litigation, Mercer was left with virtually nothing.
As Mercer demonstrates, not only does the unavailability of punitive
damages eliminate schools’ incentive to comply with Title IX prior to
litigation, it significantly reduces female athletes’ interest in bringing Title IX
suits in the first place. This is especially problematic in the Title IX sports
context, where incentives are already low. First, unlike the average litigant,
Title IX plaintiffs are under a strict time constraint—they graduate. Female
athletes, especially those in their last years of secondary school, might decide
that the likelihood that they would miss the benefits of injunctive relief weighs
against the time and expensive of litigation. Furthermore, unless plaintiffs file
class actions, which are more cumbersome and costly than individual lawsuits,
plaintiffs face the risk that their claims might become moot upon graduation,
making the entire ordeal for naught.
A second problem is that, unlike college athletes, who often travel to
attend school, plaintiffs from secondary schools must fight an institution that
is deeply ingrained in their community. As such, plaintiffs may face severe
criticism not only from members of the school, but also from friends,
prominent members of the community, or other community institutions.
Punitive damages give wronged plaintiffs additional incentive to overcome
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this adversity. In contrast, the national media attention given to verdicts like
Mercer v. Duke University, in which the lack of compensatory and punitive
damages prevented Heather Mercer from receiving any moral vindication that
she had been treated wrongly, discourages would-be plaintiffs from enforcing
their rights.
Courts should take these concerns regarding the availability of alternative
remedies into account when determining whether to apply Barnes to Title IX.
The Supreme Court explained in Cannon v. University of Chicago that
Congress had two objectives in enacting Title IX: Congress wanted (1) to
avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices, and (2)
to provide individual citizens with effective protection against those
practices.  In creating an implied private right of action under Title IX, the106
Court expressed concern that the termination of federal funding “[might] not
provide an appropriate means of accomplishing the second purpose,” the
protection of individuals.  Thereafter, the Supreme Court reaffirmed107
Congress’s commitment to the protection of individuals in Franklin, where the
Court rejected the argument that Title IX remedies should be limited to
backpay and prospective relief.  The Court explained that such remedies108
were “inadequate” and would leave the plaintiff “remediless.”  Here, the109
removal of punitive damages in Title IX cases has the same effect. Thus, the
application of Barnes to Title IX claims wrongly thwarts one of Congress’s
two Title IX objectives: the protection of individuals.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
There is more at stake in the failure of Title IX enforcement than the
opportunity to compete in a softball game, a tennis match, or a swimming
meet. What is lost is the self-worth of adolescent girls—“There isn’t anything
for us,” one Western Pennsylvania high school senior explained to the
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, “There could be a whole lot more. There could
be softball. There could be track for us. But there’s none of that; it’s all for the
boys. I’m graduating, and time has run out for me.”  Another senior had an110
even more disheartening comment:
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In sports, everybody thinks that boys are all better than girls. It’s not true. They run,
they lift, they work hard—but so do we. We work just as hard and spend just as
much time in the gym and on the field, no matter how bad our field or our equipment
may be. . . . We want to work as hard as they do. We’re tired of always being second-
stringers. It’s frustrating. We deserve everything the boys do.111
By encouraging adolescent girls to see themselves as “second-stringers” on the
field, we encourage them to see themselves as second-stringers in their
professional and social lives as well. In failing to ensure Title IX compliance,
we send a terrible and unjustifiable message to thousands of girls across the
country: “Sorry ladies, boys come first.”
Ensuring the availability of punitive damages under Title IX is one way
to improve the lack of adequate Title IX enforcement. Punitive damages will
both encourage schools to voluntarily comply with Title IX, and encourage
female athletes to overcome adversity to expose discrimination.
Unfortunately, as Parts II and III of this Note demonstrate, the obstacles to
punitive damages under Title IX are formidable. Over the past twenty years,
virtually no court has upheld punitive damage awards against secondary
schools for Title IX violations. As a result, the most effective way to improve
the enforcement of Title IX would be congressional legislation affirming the
availability of punitive damages in Title IX lawsuits. However, should this not
occur, courts still have room to act, as the law remains unsettled. The Newport
rule barring punitive damages against municipalities under § 1983 claims does
not automatically apply to Title IX, and the policy considerations of the
Newport test counsel against such an application. Likewise, only one circuit
court has extended the Barnes punitive damages bar to Title IX, and it did so
in a cursory and unpublished opinion. Congressional intent would be better
served by courts recognizing the availability of punitive damages.
Thus, while congressional action would be helpful, it is not required for
courts to uphold punitive damage awards in Title IX claims. Courts still have
the opportunity to improve Title IX enforcement and remedy the unequal
treatment of female student athletes. Courts can, and should, give girls a
fighting chance.
